Reader response Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Reader response - Essay Example Moreover, the searches they conduct as well as detainment is racially biased. The authors posit that the border patrol is a venture that has proved unsuccessful and is likely to prove so in the future. Despite the efforts made by the patrol border, masses of people still migrate into the American territory. This paper will present a response to Silko’s text. In my opinion, the border patrol exercise only serves to limit the freedom of movement enjoyed by many Americans because of the numerous stops in different places. My view conforms to the opinion of the author expressed in the first paragraph of the text when she says, â€Å"As proud citizens, we grew up believing the freedom to travel was our inalienable right, a right that some Native Americans had been denied in the early 20th century† (115). Evidently, American citizens have a right to enjoy the freedom of movement, however, the stringency of the border patrol only serves to contravene this right. With the border patrol in places, Americans are frustrated by the numerous stops impromptu searches and in the worst cases imprisonment. From the author’s experience during the fateful night when they were stopped, it becomes evident that the border patrol is a source of frustration to the Americans (Archuleta 115). The experience of the author after being stopped by the border patrol is not an isolated case because the border patrol agents are stopping people at a higher frequency than any other time in history. The author highlights that, â€Å"Unfortunately, what happened to me is an everyday occurrence here now† (118). This statement is meant to place emphasis on the increasing rates of patrols at different checkpoints. The border patrol has increased its activity and extends its control to all the highways and roads that lead to the border o emanate from the border in states such as California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. It is disturbing to learn about the different cases highlighted by the

Customer Lifetime Value - A Case Study Essay Example for Free

Customer Lifetime Value A Case Study Essay A Your manager asks you what you think might explain the differences in p, r, and AC between the three groups. What would you say? i Group 1’s higher â€Å"p† could be due to the fact that this group of students doesn’t have the meal plan that undergrad students who live on (or close to) campus have. Additionally, some MBA students may have longer classes than the typical undergad student, especially on weekends. The MBA students may be more inclined to buy more food to save and snack on during class sessions. The retention probability through a certain time â€Å"r† is expected to be higher for undergrad students who live on or closer to campus and can easily walk to the sandwich shop. MBA students still have a high retention rate, but following the completion of their MBA program, they’re less likely to drive to Ike’s for food since they commute to school (especially if they have a good sandwich shop from where they commute). Regarding â€Å"AC†, the cost to promote Ike’s for people familiar with the area (Group 2) is expected to be lower because the Bay Area natives already have some knowledge of Ike’s. The â€Å"AC† for Groups 1 3 are higher because Ike’s must promote their business to people who have most likely never heard of the sandwich shop through ads, Facebook, or coupons. b What do you think could be done to improve CLV for any of the groups? Describe a specific action that can be taken by Redhead and explain how it alters the variables and CLV in the table for one or more groups. ii I expected the CLV for Group 3 to be higher considering the distance from the school. It could be so low due to the meal plan those students might have, but by decreasing the â€Å"AC† from 25 to 20, â€Å"CLV† will increase from 2. to 7. 5. The can be done by focusing their advertising efforts aimed at students to strictly on campus efforts. Perhaps they could also utilize social media for free advertising and introduce a â€Å"punch card† where after a certain amount of sandwiches bought, the customer can get a free one. This would possibly help increase the retention rate of all groups, especially Group 1 where these MBA students don’t have an on campus meal plan and often look for good food and money saving incentives off campus. Additionally, if the retention rate for Group 1 went from . 0 to . 825 through the use of the â€Å"punch cards† and even coupons for a free drink or chips, the CLV would increase from 7 to 11. 667 almost putting Group 1 even with Group 2. And if the retention rate for Group 3 went from . 825 to . 85 through the use of the â€Å"punch cards† again, the CLV would increase from 2. 5 to 6. 875. I believe that by using more free social media advertising (decreasing AC) and increasing retention rate â€Å"r† through â€Å"punch cards† and coupons, the CLV for all groups will increase.

Physics of a Fire :: physics fire

Fire is a chemical reaction whcih needs three things to be present so it can happen: Oxygen, Fuel, and Heat. If one of these is not present, the fire cannot start. If one of these is taken from a fire it will go out. But how does this all work? Oxygen We all breathe Oxygen (OÂ ²) everyday - in fact, without it we would suffocate. But did you know that fire breathes Oxygen too? And, like us, without Oxygen a fire will also suffocate. When Oxygen in the air combines with flammable vapours given off by Fuels - heat is produced and then ignition can occur. Without enough Oxygen, ignition cannot happen. In the opposite way, if there is too much Oxygen then the vapours won't be concentrated enough to ignite. The ratio of vapour to Oxygen is known as the 'explosive' or 'flammable' limit and is different for each gas or vapour. Heat Combustion occurs when flammable vapours mix with air (Oxygen) and are ignited by a spark or flame. Solids give off flammable vapours by being heated. Certain solids such as paper or flour appear to ignite almost instantly. This is because they give off vapours and reach a flammable temperature almost immediately. In fact, fine dusts dispersed in the air can explode because they give off vapours and ignite so quickly it appear to happen instantly. Other solids like timber take longer to ignite because they are more dense and so don't give off flammable vapours so easily. Fuel So, in our fire triangle we've got Oxygen and Heat, but we also need something that will burn - this is our Fuel. Fuels can take almost any form: Solids like wood, fabric, rubber and plastic. Liquids such as petrol, oil, cooking oil or even nail varnish remover. Gases like propane, butane and 'natural' gas. If a fire broke out in your home today, would you automatically know which fire extinguisher to use? What would happen if you used a Class A fire extinguisher on a fire in the electrical service panel in your basement? Answer: you'd possibly be electrocuted if the extinguishing agent is a liquid! A long time ago, the fire protection industry recognized the need to classify extinguishers according to the many kinds of burning materials encountered in a fire. For example, Class A, water-type fire extinguishers cannot be used on the electrical fires because the extinguisher operator could be seriously injured by the conduction of electricity by the stream of water from their extinguisher.

Dividend Policy Trends

Dividend Policy of Indian Corporate Firms: An Analysis of Trends and Determinants Dr. Y. Subba Reddy1 The present study examines the dividend behavior of Indian corporate firms over the period 1990 – 2001 and attempts to explain the observed behavior with the help of trade-off theory, and signaling hypothesis. Analysis of dividend trends for a large sample of stocks traded on the NSE and BSE indicate that the percentage of companies paying dividends has declined from 60. 5 percent in 1990 to 32. percent in 2001 and that only a few firms have consistently paid the same levels of dividends. Further, dividend-paying companies are more profitable, large in size and growth doesn’t seem to deter Indian firms from paying higher dividends. Analysis of influence of changes in tax regime on dividend behavior shows that the tradeoff or tax-preference theory does not appear to hold true in the Indian context. Test of signaling hypothesis reinforces the earlier findings that dividen d omissions have information content about future earnings. However, analysis of other non-extreme dividend events such as dividend reductions and non-reductions shows that current losses are an important determinant of dividend reductions for firms with established track record and that the incidence of dividend reduction is much more severe in the case of Indian firms compared to that of firms traded on the NYSE. Further, dividend changes appear to signal contemporaneous and lagged earnings performance rather than the future earnings performance. 1 Asst. Professor, Institute for Financial Management and Research (IFMR), Chennai. The views expressed and the approach suggested are of the authors and not necessarily of NSE. 1. Introduction From the practitioners’ viewpoint, dividend policy1 of a firm has implications for investors, managers and lenders and other stakeholders. For investors, dividends – whether declared today or accumulated and provided at a later date – are not only a means of regular income2, but also an important input in valuation of a firm3. Similarly, managers’ flexibility to invest in projects is also dependent on the amount of dividend that they can ffer to shareholders as more dividends may mean fewer funds available for investment. Lenders may also have interest in the amount of dividend a firm declares, as more the dividend paid less would be the amount available for servicing and redemption of their claims. However, in a perfect world as Modigliani and Miller (1961) have shown, investors may be indifferent about the amount of dividend as it has no influenc e on the value of a firm. Any investor can create a ‘home made dividend’ if required or can invest the proceeds of a dividend payment in additional shares as and when a company makes dividend payment. Similarly, managers may be indifferent as funds would be available or could be raised with out any flotation costs for all positive net present value projects. But in reality, dividends may matter, particularly in the context of differential tax treatment of dividends and capital gains. Very often dividends are taxed at a higher rate compared to capital gains. This implies that dividends may have negative consequences for investors4. Similarly, cost of raising funds is not insignificant and may well lead to lower payout, particularly when positive net present value projects are available. Apart from flotation costs, information asymmetry between managers and outside investors may also have implications for dividend policy. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), in the presence of information asymmetry and flotation costs, investment decisions made by managers are subject to the pecking order of financing choices available. Managers prefer retained earnings to debt and debt to equity flotation to finance the available projects. Information asymmetry between agents (managers) and principals (outside shareholders) may also lead to agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One of the mechanisms o reducing expropriation of outside f shareholders by agents is high payout. High payout will result in reduction of free cash flow available to managers and this restricts the empire building efforts of managers. The presence of information asymmetry may a mean that managers need to signal their ability to lso generate higher earnings in future with the help of high dividend payouts (Bhattacharya, 1979, John and Williams 1985, and Miller and Rock, 1985). However, the credibility of signals depends on the cost of signaling – the cost being loss of financial flexibility. High payout results in reduction of free cash flow when in fact the firm needs more funds to pursue high growth opportunities. Rozeff (1994) models payout ratios as a function of three factors: flotation costs of external funding, agency cost of outside ownership and financing constraints as a result of higher operating and financial leverage5. To summarize, several theories have been proposed in explaining why companies pay dividends6. While many earlier studies point out the tax-preference theory, more recent studies emphasize signaling and agency cost rationale of dividend payments. However, the dividend puzzle is yet unresolved and the words of Brealey (1992) poses the dividend policy decision as â€Å"What is the effect of a change in cash dividends, given the firm’s capital-budgeting and borrowing decisions? † In other words, he looks at dividend policy in isolation and not as a by-product of other corporate financial decisions. 2 Lintner (1956) finds that firms pay regular and predictable dividends to investors, where as the earnings of corporate firms could be erratic. This implies that shareholders prefer smoothened dividend income. Bernstein (1998) observes that given the ‘concocted’ earnings estimates provided by firms, the low dividend payout induces reinvestment risk and earnings risk for the investors. 4 Black (1976) notes that in the presence of taxes, investors â€Å"prefer smaller dividends or no dividends at all†. 5 According to Kalay (1982), in the absence of restraining covenants, shareholders can transfer wealt h from bondholders by paying off dividend to themselves either by selling existing assets or by reducing investment or by using proceeds of a senior debt. 6 Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) survey different streams of research work on dividends. 2 Fischer Black (Black 1976) may well apply in today’s context: â€Å"The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don’t fit together†. One of the striking aspects that have been noticed in recent periods is the lower dividend paid by corporate firms in the US. Fama and French (2001) analyze the issue of lower dividends paid by corporate firms over the period 1973-1999 and the factors responsible for such a decline. They attribute the decline to changing firm characteristics of size, earnings and growth. However, it is to be seen whether the change owards lower dividends is a permanent feature or will there be reversal. A decline in dividends, according to Fama and Frenc h, could be due to lower transaction costs, improved corporate governance mechanisms, and the increasing preference towards capital gains. 1. 1 Indian Scenario In the Indian context, a few studies have analyzed the dividend behavior of corporate firms. Mahapatra and Sahu (1993) find cash flow as a major determinant of dividend followed by net earnings. Bhat and Pandey (1994) undertake a survey of managers’ perceptions of dividend decision and find that managers perceive current earnings as the most significant factor. Narasimhan and Asha (1997) observe that the uniform tax rate of 10 percent on dividend as proposed by the Indian union budget 1997-98, alters the demand of investors in favor of high payouts. Mohanty (1999) finds that firms, which issued bonus shares, have either maintained the pre-bonus level or only decreased it marginally there by increasing the payout to shareholders. Narasimhan and Vijayalakshmi (2002) analyze the influence of ownership structure on dividend payout and find no influence of insider ownership on dividend behavior of firms. However, it is still not clear as to what is the dividend payment pattern of firms in India and why do they initiate and omit dividend payments or reduce or increase dividend payments. Hence it is proposed to analyze the dividend payout of firms in India and analyze the dividend initiations and omissions and other changes in dividends and the signals that these events convey. Following Fama and French (2001), the present study also attempts to analyze the impact of profitability, size and growth on the dividend payout of firms. Similarly, following Healy and Palepu (1988) an attempt is made to analyze the signaling hypothesis, i. e. arnings information conveyed by dividend initiations and omissions. Since, initiations and omissions construe extreme dividend events, changes in dividends i. e. , increases and decreases and the information that they convey is also examined following DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1992). There have been several changes in the tax regime in the last few years. The union budget 1997-98 made dividends taxable at t e hands of company paying them and not in the hands of investors receiving them. h Similarly there have been changes in the capital gains tax and exemption of dividend income under Section 80 L of the Income Tax Act 1961. All these changes have implications for the dividend policy of corporate firms. According to tax-preference or trade-off theory, favorable dividends tax should lead to higher payouts. Hence it is proposed to analyze the impact of tax regimes on dividend policies of corporate firms. 1. 2 Objectives 1. To study the trends in the dividend payment pattern of Indian corporate firms; 2. To analyze the impact of changes in dividend tax on the propensity to pay dividends; 3. To analyze the influence of firm characteristics such as profitability, growth and size on the dividend payment pattern; 4. To analyze the signaling hypothesis, specifically earnings information conveyed by dividend initiations and omissions; and 5. To analyze the influence of loss on dividend reductions. 3 In other words, the present study focuses on an analysis of dividend trends and attempts to analyze the determinants of these trends with the help of trade-off or tax-preference theory and signaling hypothesis. There are other important determinants of dividend behavior such as transactions costs, which we will not analyze, in the present study. In the next Section, we review the relevant literature, followed by a description of the database employed and methodology adopted in Section 3. Dividend trends are discussed in Section 4, and the analysis of characteristics of dividend payers is presented in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 deal with the signaling hypothesis: first the case of dividend initiations and omissions and second dividend reductions. Section 8 summarizes the finding of study, points out limitations and concludes with directions for further research. 2. Review of Relevant Literature DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1992) analyses the relationship between dividends and losses and the information conveyed by dividend changes about the earnings performance. They examine the dividend behaviour of 167 NYSE firms with at least one annual loss during 1980-95 and those of 440 firms with no losses during the same period, where all the firms had a consistent track record of ten or more years of positive earnings and dividends. They find that 50. 9% of 167 firms with at least one loss during 1980-95 reduced dividends, compared to 1% of 440 firms without losses. Their findings support signaling hypothesis in that dividend changes improve the ability to predict future earnings performance. Glen et al. (1995) study the dividend policy of firms in emerging markets. They find that firms in these markets have a target dividend payout rate, but less concerned with volatility in dividends over time. They also find that shareholders and governments exert a great deal of influence on dividend policy and observe that dividends have little signaling content in these markets. Benartzi, Michaely, Thaler (1997) analyzes the issue of whether dividend changes signal the future or the past. For a sample of 7186 dividend announcements made by NYSE or AMEX firms during the period 1979-91, they find a lagged and contemporaneous relation between dividend changes and earnings. Their analysis also shows that in the two years following dividend increases, earnings changes are unrelated to the sign and magnitude of dividend changes. Bernsterin (1998) expresses concern over the decline in payout over a period of time in the US market. He observes that given the ‘concocted’ earnings estimates provided by firms, the low dividend payout induces reinvestment risk and earnings risk for the investors. He asserts that â€Å"†¦ try calculating the historical correlation between payout ratios in year t and earnings growth over t + 5. The correlation coefficient is positive and statistically significant† 7. Fama and French (2001) analyze the issue of lower dividends paid by corporate firms over the period 1973-1999 and the factors responsible for the decline. In particular they analyze whether the lower dividends were the effect of changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay on the part of firms. They observe that proportion of companies paying dividend has dropped from a peak of 66. 5 percent in 1978 to 20. 8 percent in 1999. They attribute this decline to the changing characteristics of firms: â€Å"The decline in the incidence of dividend payers is in part due to an increasing tilt of publicly traded firms toward the characteristics – small size, low earnings, and high growth – of firms that typically have never paid dividends†8. Baker, Veit and Powell (2001) study the factors that have a bearing on dividend policy decisions of corporate firms traded on the Nasdaq. The tudy, based on a sample survey (1999) response of 188 firms out of a total of 630 firms that paid dividends in each quarter of calendar years 1996 and 1997, finds that the following four factors have a significant impact on the dividend decision: pattern of past dividends, stability 7 8 Bernstein (1998), pp. 1. Fama and French (2001), p. 79 4 of earnings, and the level of current and fut ure expected earnings. The study also finds statistically significant differences in the importance that managers attach to dividend policy in different industries such as financial versus non-financial firms. Ramacharran (2001) analyzes the variation in dividend yield for 21 emerging markets (including India) for the period 1992-99. His macroeconomic approach using country risk data finds evidence for pecking order hypothesis – lower dividends are paid when higher growth is expected. The study also finds that political risk factors have no significant impact on dividend payments of firms in emerging markets. Lee and Ryan (2002) analyze the dividend signaling-hypothesis and the issue of direction of causality between earnings and dividends – whether earnings cause dividends or vice versa. For a sample of 133 dividend initiations and 165 dividend omissions, they find that dividend payment is influenced by recent performance of earnings, and free cash flows. They also find evidence of positive (negative) earnings growth preceding dividend initiations (omissions). 2. 1 Previous Indian Studies Kevin (1992) analyzes the dividend distribution pattern of 650 non-financial companies which closed their accounts between September 1983 and August 1984 and net sales income of one crore rupees or more. He finds evidence for a sticky dividend policy and concludes that a change in profitability is of minor importance. Mahapatra and Sahu (1993) analyze the determinants of dividend policy using the models developed by Lintner (1956), Darling (1957) and Brittain (1966) for a sample of 90 companies for the period 1977-78 – 1988-89. They find that cash flow is a major determinant of dividend followed by net earnings. Further, their analysis shows that past dividend and not past earnings is a significant factor in influencing the dividend decision of firms. Bhat and Pandey (1994) study the managers’ perceptions of dividend decision for a sample of 425 Indian companies for the period 1986-87 to 1990-91. They find that on an average profit-making Indian companies have distributed about one-third of their net earnings and that the average dividend payout ratio is 43. 6 percent. They also find that the average dividend payout ratio is 54 percent for the sample of both profitmaking and loss-making companies and the average dividend rate is in the range of 14. 3 percent to 19. 2 percent. They also observe variation in dividend policy of different industries. Further, a survey of these 425 companies has been attempted. How ever, only 31 questionnaires have been received and of these they find 28 amenable for further analysis. Their analysis of the respondents shows that managers perceive current earnings as the most significant factor influencing their dividend decision followed by patterns of past dividends. They also find two other variables increasing equity base and expected future earnings to have significant influence. However, they find industry to have the least influence on the dividend, which has been contrary to the expectations. Mishra and Narender (1996) analyze the dividend policies of 39 state-owned enterprises (SoE) in India for the period 1984-85 to 1993-94. The find that earnings per share (EPS) is a major factor in determining the dividend payout of SoEs. Narasimhan and Asha (1997) discuss the impact of dividend tax on dividend policy of firms. They observe that the uniform tax rate of 10 percent on dividend as proposed by the Indian union budget 1997-98, alters the demand of investors in favor of high payouts rather than low payouts as the capital gains are taxed at 20 percent in the said period. Mohanty (1999) analyzes the dividend behavior of more than 200 firms for a period of over 15 years. He finds that in most bonus issue cases firms have either maintained the pre-bonus level or only decreased it marginally there by increasing the payout to shareholders. The study also finds that firms that declared bonus during 1982-1991 showed higher returns to their shareholders compared to firms which did not issue bonus shares but maintained a steady dividend growth. He finds evidence for a reversal of this trend in the 1992- 5 1996 period. He attributes such a reversal in trend to the changed strategy of multi-national corporations (MNCs) and their reluctance to issue bonus shares. Narasimhan and Vijayalakshmi (2002) analyze the influence of ownership structure on dividend payout of 186 manufacturing firms. Regression analysis shows that promoters’ holding as of September 2001 has no influence on average dividend payout for the period 1997-2001. 3. Database and Methodology 3. 1 Database Dividend payment pattern of all companies that are listed for trading on one of the two major exchanges namely National Stock Exchange (NSE) and Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) during the period 1989-1990 to 2000-2001 (we refer each year henceforth with the end year i. e. for 2000-2001 to 2001) are employed for analysis. The data has been sourced from Prowess database of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). For the purpose of this study, only final cash dividends are considered and stock repurchases and stock dividends are not considered. Unlike the firms in developed countries that pay quarterly dividends, Indian companies typically pay only one dividend during a year. A few firms do pay interim dividends, however, data regarding these are not readily accessible and it is extremely difficult to get such data for a reasonable number of years. Further, stock repurchases have been permitted only recently and only about a hundred companies have bought back their stocks so far. Hence, in the present study stock repurchases are not considered for analysis. Stock price data for the prior year of dividend announcement are also taken from the Prowess database. 3. 2 Methodology for Analysis of Trends To analyze the trends in dividend payment pattern, number of companies paying dividend as percentage of total firms, average dividend paid, dividend per share, payout ratio, and dividend yield are computed for the period 1990 to 2001. Dividend per share (DPS) is calculated as DPS j ,t = Dividend j ,t EQCap j ,t Where, DPSj,t refers to dividend per share for company j in year t; Dividend j,t refers to amount of dividend paid by company j in year t; and EQCap j,t refers to paid -up equity capital for firm j in year t. Equity capital is employed instead of the usual number of outstanding shares in the denominator as it facilitates comparison of rupee dividend paid per share by removing the impact of different face or par values. Dividend payout ratio (PR) is computed as PR jt = Dividend j , t PAT j ,t Where, PR j,t is dividend payout ratio, Dividend j,t refers to amount of dividend paid by company j in year t; and PATj,t refers to net profit or profit after tax for firm j in year t. Dividend Yield (DY) is computed as 6 DY jt = DPS j ,t Price j ,t ? 1 t Where, DYjt refers to dividend yield for firm j in year t, DPSjt refers to dividend per share for firm j in year , and Pricej,t-1 is closing price of previous year for firm j. Further, the entire sample is categorized into payers and non-payers to examine the trends in dividends across different subgroups. Payers are those firms that have paid dividend in the current year, where as nonpayers have not paid dividend in the current year. Payers are further classified into regular payers, initiators and current payers. Regular payers are those firms that have paid dividend regularly without ever skipping the payments. Initiators on the other hand refers to those firms with a maiden dividend, where as current payers are those firms who are neither regular payers nor initiators. Non-payers are further categorized into never paid, former payers and current non-payers. Never paid firms are those that have never paid even a single dividend, where as former payers are those firms which at some previous point had paid dividends. Current non-payers are those firms which are recently listed and that they are neither former-payers nor are in the never paid category in any of the previous years. 3. 3 Influence of Tax Regime Change: Test of Trade-off Theory Paired samples t-test has been employed to analyze the influence of changes in dividend tax during 199798 on the dividend propensity of Indian corporate firms. According to the tradeoff theory, corporate firms pay more dividends when the dividend tax is low compared to that of capital gains tax. The tax regime ushered in during 1997-98, whereby dividends are taxed at source at a uniform rate of 10%, has tilted the balance in favor of dividends. Changes in dividends are captured with the help of two measures – dividend per share and dividend payout percentage. For this purpose total dividend per share and average dividend payout percentage during the previous tax regime, i. e. the incidence of dividend tax is on the investors are compared with that of changed tax regime where dividend taxes are payable by corporate firms at a flat rate of 10%. The period 1994-95 to 1996-97 constitutes the first sub-period and the period 1998-99 to 2000-01 constitutes the second period. The following hypotheses are tested using paired samples t-test: (i) Null hypothesis of no differences between the total dividend per share between the two periods; and (ii) Null hypothesis of no difference between the average percentage payout between the two periods. Further, changes in the propensity of regular payers and changes in the payment pattern between 1996-97 and 1998-99 as a result of change in tax regime are also tested. 3. 4 Characteristics of Payers and Non-Payers Consistent with Fama and French, logit regression coefficients are estimated to analyze the influence of firm characteristics on the dividend payment pattern, for each year t during 1990-2001. The dependent variable assumes a value of 0 when the firm pays no dividend and assumes a value of 1 when pays a dividend. The explanatory variables are: Et/At is profitability measured as the ratio of aggregate earnings before interest to aggregate assets; dAt/At, is growth rate of assets; Vt/At is market-to-book ratio i. e. , the ratio of the aggregate market value to the aggregate book value of assets; and the NSEPt is the percent of firms with the same or lower market capitalization. Coefficients are computed for each of the year 7 and the aggregate coefficients and associated t values are analyzed to infer the influence o profitability, f growth and size. 3. Test of Signalling Hypothesis: Case of Dividend Initiations and Omissions For this part of the analysis, a firm is classified as initiator if it has paid dividend in the current year but has not paid dividends for the preceding 3 years. Similarly a firm is categorized as omission firm, if the firm has not currently paid dividend but has paid dividend in the preceding three years. To analyze signaling hypothesis, consistent with Healey and Palepu , earnings patterns of firms initiating and omitting dividend for 3 years before the year of event and 3 years after event are examined. To aggregate results across firms, earnings changes in these years are expressed as a percentage of the previous year’s closing stock price, PJ. The standardized change in earnings for firm j in year t, is defines as ? E j ,t = E j ,t ? E j ,t ? 1 Pj Where Ej,t are earnings per share before extraordinary items and discontinued operations9 for firm j in year t. The null hypotheses of average earnings changes are zero is tested with the help of Dunnett’s C (Post Hoc) test. Analysis pertaining to initiations and omissions only cover a particular sample of extreme events and excludes firms not having a dividend track record of less than 3 years. In order to cover other dividend events like dividend reductions and increases in the following we arrive at yet another sample. 3. 6 Test of Signaling Hypothesis: Case of Dividend Reductions To analyze the relationship between dividends and losses a sample is drawn with firms having consistent profitability and dividend track records during 1990 – 1995 and who have earnings and dividend information for the period 1996 – 2001. The importance of annual losses on dividend reductions and annual dividend omissions has been analyzed with the help of logit analysis. The dependent variable equals zero if a firm has maintained or increased its dividend per share and is equal to one if the firm announced a reduction in dividend per share. The loss dummy assumes a value of one if the firm reports a loss for the year under study and zero otherwise. The level of net income and changes in net income are standardized with the previous year’s net worth for each firm. For firms in loss sample, the initial loss year constitutes the event year where as for non-loss firms, the initial year of earnings decline constitutes the event year. Similarly to examine the influence of past and future levels of earnings logit analysis has been employed on the subset for event years 1997 and 1998. The dependent variable equals zero if a firm has maintained or increased its dividend per share and is equal to one if the firm announced a reduction in dividend per share. The explanatory variables are earnings in 1 year before the event (t-1), 2 years preceding the event (t-2), current earnings (t), earnings in the year following the event year (t+1), earnings in 2 years following the event (t+2). Similarly, mean difference in earnings over t 2 through t+2 years is also examined with the help of Dunnett’s C test. This analysis would be useful in determining whether dividend changes are impacted by contemporaneous or lagged or expected earnings performance. 9 In the Indian context an approximate value for this is derived from ‘other income’. 8 4. Trends in Dividends and Influence of Changes in Tax Regime Average profit after tax (PAT) has increased from Rs. 4. 68 crore in 1990 to Rs. 6. 11 crore in 2000 and Rs. 9. 36 crore in 2001 (Table 4. 1). However, there have been several fluctuations in average PAT reflecting the changes in Indian economy. In the early phases of economic reform, many firms had to restructure as the economy was opened up and structural adjustments were undertaken resulting in a reduction in PAT. The subsequent pick up in the mid -90s has seen an increase in average PAT. The late 1990s, which marked a significant decline in economic activity, have had their impact on PAT of firms. 4. 1 Average Dividend Paid Despite fluctuations in PAT, the average aggregate dividend payments have steadily increased from Rs. . 99 crore in 1990 to Rs. 2. 93 crore in 2000 and Rs. 4. 19 crore in 2001. Further, compared to PAT the dividend payments have exhibited a smooth trend implying that dividend smoothening is occurring in the Indian context (Figure 4. 1). Table 4. 1 Trend in Dividends and PAT During 1990-2001 Year Number of Firms 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Common Firms 1707 2184 2505 30 97 4020 5115 5600 5855 5980 6248 6225 4766 871 Average Dividend Rs. Crore 0. 99 0. 98 1. 11 1. 11 1. 27 1. 56 1. 85 2. 05 2. 26 2. 9 2. 93 4. 19 SD of Average SD of Dividend PAT PAT Rs. Crore Rs. Crore Rs. Crore 3. 92 4. 68 48. 45 3. 79 4. 05 37. 88 4. 54 4. 19 40. 45 4. 85 3. 06 46. 76 6. 19 4. 15 51. 41 8. 42 6. 96 57. 55 10. 80 7. 19 62. 92 13. 91 6. 38 65. 65 17. 18 5. 69 103. 52 22. 14 5. 09 88. 19 26. 46 6. 11 103. 54 44. 71 9. 36 134. 39 Number of firms paid dividend during the study period have shown an up trend till 1995 and have fallen subsequently (Appendix Figure 4. 1), where as the percentage of companies paying dividends has declined from 60. percent in 1990 to 32. 1 percent in 2001 (Table 4. 2 and Figure 4. 2). This is consistent with the trend observed in the US market (Fama and French 2001). The fact that percentage of companies paying dividends have declined whereas the average dividend paid has increased implies tha t companies which have been paying dividend have paid higher amounts in recent years. Total non-payers have steadily increased from 1990 to 2000 before declining slightly in 2001 (Appendix Table A4. 1 and Figures A4. 2 and A4. 3). Firms, which have never paid dividend, constituted a significant proportion through out the sample period – constituting more than 50% from 1991 to 2001 continuously. The number of firms, which at some previous time paid dividend, have increased overtime and reached almost 50% of non-payers in 2001. Figure 4. 1 9 Trend in Average Dividends, and PAT During 1990-2001 Average Dividend Average PAT 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Rs. Crores Year Table 4. 2 Trend in Dividend Payments During 1990-2001 Year Paid Dividend No. 033 1272 1533 1823 2333 2775 2723 2386 2101 2007 1988 1531 % 60. 50 58. 20 61. 20 58. 90 58. 00 54. 30 48. 60 40. 80 35. 10 32. 10 31. 90 32. 10 Not Paid Dividend No. 674 912 972 1274 1687 2340 2877 3469 3879 4241 4237 3235 % 39. 50 41. 80 38. 80 41. 10 42. 00 45. 70 51. 40 59. 20 64. 90 67. 90 68. 10 67. 90 Total Number of Firms 1707 2184 2505 3097 4020 5115 5600 5855 5980 6248 6225 4766 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total number of firms paying dividend has increased up to 1995 and has registered sustained decline there after (Table 4. , Appendix Figures A4. 4 and A4. 5). Mirroring these trends firms, which have paid dividends regularly, peaked in 1995 and recorded declines thereafter. Initiators have shown a steady decline from 1991 and have fallen to 5% in 2001. Average dividend paid by payers has increased steadily from Rs. 1. 69 crore in 1991 to Rs. 9. 16 crore in 2000 and Rs. 13. 05 crore in 2001 (Figure 4. 3, Appendix Table A4. 2). Regular payers are more in number and have paid higher average dividend compared to that of current payers and initiators (Appendix Figures A4. 6 and A4. 7). Current payers have paid higher dividend compared to initiators except in the year 2001. The number of initiators have increased up to the year 1995 and have shown a decline thereafter, where as current payers have steadily increased in number up to 2000. 10 Figure 4. 2 Dividend Behaviour of Indian Corporate Firms During 1990 – 2001 (in %) 80% 70% 60% % Non-Payers % Payers % of Firms 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Year Figure 4. 3 Comparision of Average Dividend Paid During 1991 2001 by Payer Group Initiator Current Payers Regular Payers Total Payers 20 15 10 5 0 Rs. Crore 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Year A comparison of index and non-index firms shows that the former group of companies on average has paid more dividend than the latter group (Table A4. 3 and A4. 4). Similarly, it is observed that companies, which constitute popular market indices such as Sensex and Nifty paid more dividends compared to companies in the broad market indices such as BSE 100, CNX Mid-Cap, BSE 200, CNX 500, and BSE 500. These observations are on the expected lines as higher dividend payment is one of the important criteria for inclusion of stocks into indices. A study of number of companies paying dividend also reveals that a significantly larger proportion of index firms have paid dividend compared to non-index firms. 29 out of 30 Sensex firms and 49 out of 50 Nifty firms have paid dividend in 2001, the exception being Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. (TELCO). Analysis of industry-wise average dividend paid shows that in the early 1990s, firms in the diversified industry have paid more dividends followed by mining firms and electricity firms (Table 4. 3). However, by the end of 2000 and 2001 firms in the electricity industry have paid more dividend followed by mining and diversified companies. It has also been observed that textile companies have continued to pay low amounts on an average throughout the sample period where as firms in the financial services industry have improved their average dividend payments over the sample period. The recent h growth firms in the computer igh 11 hardware and software segments, which are part of the machinery industry, have generally shown lower dividend payments. In sum, the number of firms paying dividend during the study period have shown an up trend till 1995 and have fallen subsequently. Further, compared to PAT the dividend payments have exhibited a smooth trend implying that dividend smoothening is occurring in the Indian context. Regular payers are more in number and have paid higher average dividend compared to that of current payers and initiators. Of the nonpayers, former payers are growing in numbers. Index firms appear to pay higher dividends compared to that of non-index firms. Further, smaller indices appear to have higher average dividend compared t that of o larger indices. Industry trends indicate that firms in the electricity, mining and diversified industries have paid more dividend where as textile companies have paid less dividends. Firms in the machinery industry which includes computer hardware and software segments have shown lower dividends. Table 4. 3 INDUSTRY Average Dividend Paid During 1990-2001 – Industry-wise (in Rs. Crore) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1. 09 3. 56 1. 28 . 67 . 88 . 70 . 80 2. 57 . 39 . 50 1. 02 . 48 1. 25 . 96 3. 88 1. 14 1. 39 . 97 . 65 . 90 2. 79 . 51 . 62 . 76 . 47 1. 17 1. 05 4. 24 1. 19 1. 47 . 98 . 72 1. 37 2. 97 . 72 . 70 . 86 . 47 1. 0 . 97 5. 11 2. 26 1. 38 . 89 . 73 1. 36 3. 57 . 62 . 64 . 92 . 53 1. 06 1. 08 6. 14 5. 85 1. 49 . 94 . 83 1. 72 2. 87 . 73 . 63 1. 01 . 72 1. 39 1. 38 1. 57 1. 69 1. 92 7. 72 10. 13 10. 99 12. 86 9. 54 13. 08 18. 31 17. 37 2. 10 2. 46 2. 72 3. 16 1. 02 . 80 . 90 1. 12 . 99 1. 11 1. 13 1. 20 2. 20 2. 39 2. 14 1. 80 2. 94 8. 87 17. 44 22. 23 . 70 . 75 . 57 . 35 . 85 1. 18 1. 00 . 86 1. 07 1. 18 1. 23 1. 34 . 86 . 82 . 58 . 51 2. 02 2. 83 3. 58 3. 18 1. 68 17. 17 26. 33 3. 20 1. 13 1. 34 1. 40 21. 99 . 56 . 90 1. 34 . 48 2. 95 2. 41 22. 76 27. 24 4. 25 1. 34 1. 58 1. 72 26. 31 . 58 1. 12 1. 42 . 56 3. 44 2001 Firms 2. 46 29. 55 48. 7 5. 29 1. 89 2. 11 3. 08 35. 36 1. 05 1. 51 4. 07 . 56 3. 03 1138 184 58 1097 745 1065 555 81 324 296 1264 750 225 Chemicals and Plastics Diversified Electricity Financial Services Food and Beverages Machinery Metals and Metal Product Mining Misc. Manufacturing Non-Metallic Mineral Pro Other Services Textiles Transport Equipment 4. 2 Dividend Per Share Average dividend per share (DPS) has increased from 14 paisa in 1990 to 26 paisa in 2000 and 15 paisa in 2001 (Table 4. 4, Figure 4. 4). An analysis of distribution of firms shows that 39 percent have paid nil DPS in 1990 and the percentage has increased to 67. 7 in 2001 (Table 4. ). Percentage of firms in the average class i. e. , DPS in the range of Rs. 0 to Rs. 0. 25 have declined from a high of 45. 9 in 1990 to 18. 5 in 2001. This implies that the increased average DPS over the latter period has mainly been due to a few firms paying larger DPS. Firms in chemicals and plastics industry have steadily improved their DPS from 14 paisa in 1990 to 27 paisa in 2000 and 25 paisa in 2001 (Table 4. 6). Where as textiles firms have shown a decline in DPS from 13 paisa in 1990 to 6 paisa in 2001. Machinery firms have paid a steady 12 to 14 paisa except for the years 1996 and 1997 when they paid marginally more. An analysis of index and non-index firms DPS shows that index firms on an average paid more DPS than non-index firms (Table A4. 14). Similarly, narrow indices have high average DPS than broad indices. 12 Table 4. 4 Average Dividend Per Share (DPS) During 1990-2001 (in Rs. ) Year Number Minimum Maximum of Firms DPS DPS 1990 1694 0 12. 71 1991 2153 0 10. 58 1992 2468 0 15. 58 1993 3028 0 51. 2 1994 3953 0 57. 5 1995 5032 0 135. 33 1996 5536 0 174. 67 1997 5801 0 222 1998 5911 0 350. 33 1999 6176 0 249. 75 2000 6167 0 266. 38 2001 4734 0 61. 5 Common 866 Firms10 Average DPS 0. 1406 0. 1385 0. 1427 0. 1514 0. 1582 0. 803 0. 2158 0. 198 0. 2337 0. 2544 0. 2571 0. 1538 Std. Deviation 0. 3455 0. 3009 0. 3568 1. 0025 1. 2983 2. 3543 3. 3243 3. 4834 5. 8833 4. 8938 4. 4156 1. 2899 Average DPS (1% trimmed) by all payers have increased from 21 paisa in 1991 to 31 paisa in 2000 and 29 paisa in 2001 (Figure 4. 5). Of the payers, regular payers have consistently paid more dividend per share compar ed to other payers. Similarly initiators have always paid lower dividend per share compared to current payers. Figure 4. 4 Average Dividend Per Share (DPS) During 1990-2001 Average DPS (in Rs. ) Average DPS 0. 30 0. 25 0. 20 0. 15 0. 10 0. 05 0. 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Year An analysis of recurrence of dividend per share group shows that two firms have consistently paid dividend in the range of 25 to 50 paisa per share for all the 12 years, where as 18 firms have paid up to 25 paisa (Appendix Table A4. 6 and A4. 7). An analysis of dividend reductions by firms shows that only five companies namely Mahindra Sintered Products Ltd, Otis Elevator Co. (India), Bharat Electronics, Amritlal Chemaux, and Carborundum Universal have consistently paid higher dividend per share out of a 330 firms that paid dividends in all years of the sample period (Appendix Table A4. ). 43 firms registered a single instance of dividend per share reduction, where as 68 firms lowered twice, 82 firms lowe red thrice etc. On the whole average DPS has shown a steady growth except in the year 2001. Regular payers have consistently paid more dividend per share compared to other payers, where as initiators have always paid 5 common firms are lost on account of missing information on number of outstanding stocks and hence there is difference in the number of common firms from that of Table 4. 1. 10 13 lower dividend per share. Analysis also shows that only a few firms have consistently paid same levels of dividend. Index firms on an average paid more DPS than non-index firms. Similarly, narrow indices have high average DPS than broad indices (Appendix table A4. 8). Firms in chemicals and plastics industry have steadily improved their DPS, where as textiles firms have shown a decline in the study period. Machinery firms have paid a steady DPS. Figure 4. 5 1% Trimmed Dividend Per Share by Payer Type Current Payers Initiators Regular Payers Total 0. 35 0. 3 DPS (in Rs. ) 0. 25 0. 2 0. 15 0. 1 0. 05 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Year Table 4. 5 Distribution of Firms in terms of Dividend Per Share During 1990 – 2001 DPS Rs. Rs. 0 – 0. 25 Rs. 0. 25 – 0. 50 Rs. 0. 50 – 0. 75 Rs. 0. 75 – 1 Rs. 1 – 2 Rs. 2 – 5 > Rs. 5 Percentage of Companies in Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 39 41 37. 9 39. 9 41. 1 44. 9 50. 8 58. 9 64. 5 67. 5 67. 8 67. 7 45. 9 43. 1 46. 2 46. 9 45 42. 3 35. 8 27. 5 22. 2 19. 5 18. 6 18. 5 13. 5 13. 7 13 . 7 11. 2 12. 1 10. 6 10. 4 9. 8 8. 7 7. 6 7. 4 7. 8 0. 9 1. 3 1. 4 0. 9 0. 7 1. 1 1. 5 2. 3 2. 8 2. 5 2. 6 2. 7 0. 4 0. 5 0. 4 0. 7 0. 8 0. 4 0. 6 0. 6 0. 6 1. 1 1. 2 1. 3 0. 2 0. 3 0. 3 0. 2 0. 2 0. 3 0. 4 0. 6 1 1. 1 1. 4 1. 4 0. 1 0. 1 0 0. 1 0. 1 0. 2 0. 2 0. 1 0. 0. 3 0. 6 0. 4 0. 1 0 0 0. 2 0. 1 0. 1 0. 2 0. 2 0. 2 0. 3 0. 4 0. 3 Table 4. 6 Industry-wise Dividend Per Share (DPS) During 1990-2001 (in Rs. ) INDUSTRY Chemicals and Plastics Diversified Electricity Financial Services Food and Beverages Machineray Metals and Metal Product Mining Misc. Manufacturing Non-Metallic Mineral Pro Other Services Textiles Transport Equipment 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 FIRMS . 14 . 15 . 14 . 12 . 17 . 15 . 12 . 17 . 17 . 18 . 27 . 25 1138 . 19 . 21 . 26 . 20 . 20 . 19 . 21 . 22 . 21 . 22 . 27 . 21 184 . 13 . 10 . 11 . 11 . 11 . 10 . 12 . 9 . 10 . 10 . 13 . 10 58 . 08 . 11 . 13 . 34 . 24 . 21 . 28 . 12 . 15 . 14 . 19 . 18 1097 . 20 . 20 . 18 . 23 . 31 . 47 . 4 9 . 58 . 85 . 21 . 16 . 13 745 . 12 . 13 . 14 . 14 . 13 . 13 . 17 . 19 . 12 . 14 . 14 . 14 1065 . 13 . 11 . 11 . 09 . 10 . 10 . 12 . 09 . 07 . 06 . 07 . 07 555 . 05 . 07 . 06 . 07 . 09 . 06 . 07 . 08 . 13 . 10 . 11 . 09 81 . 12 . 12 . 14 . 10 . 11 . 10 . 10 . 15 . 06 . 16 . 21 . 30 324 . 10 . 11 . 11 . 09 . 09 . 09 . 10 . 08 . 08 . 07 . 09 . 09 296 . 17 . 15 . 17 . 15 . 13 . 24 . 38 . 28 . 42 . 88 . 73 . 12 1264 . 13 . 14 . 13 . 11 . 12 . 09 . 08 . 06 . 06 . 05 . 07 . 06 750 . 2 . 12 . 12 . 12 . 13 . 13 . 15 . 18 . 16 . 15 . 21 . 17 225 14 4. 3 Dividend Payout Ratio An analysis of average percentage dividend payout (PR) during 1990 – 2001 shows a volatile trend (Table 4. 7 and Figure 4. 6). Percentage PR increased from 27. 39 in 1990 to 32. 95 in 1997 and then showed a declining trend till 2000 before reaching the peak average percentage PR of 40. 53 in 2001. However, 1% trimmed average percentage PR showed a more stable pattern of around 24 percent PR up to 1997 and then has shown a declining trend before finally reaching 16. 81 percent in 2001 (Appendix Table A4. ). Table 4. 7 Average Percentage Payout During 1990 – 2001 Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 No. of Average Std. Firms % Payout Deviation 1382 1714 2022 2533 3156 3770 4042 4258 4335 4503 4383 3387 27. 39 25. 19 27. 54 27. 98 28. 19 25. 88 27. 44 32. 95 31. 39 22. 82 21. 6 40. 53 37. 77 41. 04 48. 31 37. 83 61. 96 38. 06 88. 12 139. 85 453. 37 120. 19 67. 49 1196. 96 1% Trimmed Average % Payout 24. 98 23. 11 24. 25 25. 72 24. 92 23. 84 23. 99 23. 91 18. 64 16. 98 17. 47 16. 81 1% Trimmed No. of Firms 1369 1697 2002 2508 3125 3733 4002 4216 4292 4458 4340 3354 An analysis of distribution of firms by dividend payout percentage shows that as high as 26 percent of firms in 1990 and 56. 6 percent in 2001 have paid out nothing (Table 4. 8 and Appendix, Figure A4. 6). However, more than 10 percent firms have paid dividend in excess of 75 percent of their net profits. An analysis of dividend payout recurrence shows that very few firms have maintained the same payout for a longer period of time (Appendix Table A4. 10 and A4. 11). For instance, only one firm – Hindustan Lever Limited – has paid out a dividend in the range of 50 to 75% of its net profit for entire sample period. Similarly another firm – Maharashtra Scooters Limited – maintained a dividend payout in the range of 10 to 20% for 11 of the 12-year sample period. Similarly, Kinetic Engineering Ltd. , Lakshmi Machine Works Ltd. , and Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. have paid out in the range of 10 – 20% for 10 of the 12-year sample period. Figure 4. 6 Average % Payout During 1990-2001 Average % Payout 50 40 30 20 10 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 1% Trimmed Average % Payout Average Payout % Year 15 An analysis of industry-wise DPO shows a declining trend across all industries during the sample period (Table 4. ). Diversified firms, which have a DPO in excess of 25 percent in 1990, have less than 14 percent in 2001. Firms in metals and metal products industry have registered a high degree fall in DPO from 22. 84 percent in 1990 to 8. 74 percent in 2001. Table 4. 8 Distribution of Firms’ Payout Percentage During 1990 – 2001 Dividend Payout % 0 0 – 10 10 – 20 20 – 30 30 – 40 40 – 50 50 – 75 75 – 100 100 – 200 > 200 Firms % of Firms 1990 1991 26 6. 9 14. 5 16. 5 12. 6 8. 2 10. 1 3. 5 1. 2 0. 4 1382 1992 1993 28. 9 7. 2 11. 9 13. 5 12. 3 9. 5 10. 5 4. 6 1. 3 0. 4 2533 1994 26. 6 8 14. 3 15 12. 7. 7 10. 2 4. 5 0. 9 0. 3 3156 1995 26. 7 6. 6 15. 6 16. 7 12. 5 8. 7 8. 6 3. 4 0. 9 0. 3 3770 1996 33. 3 5. 5 13. 6 13. 7 10. 8 7. 3 8. 6 5. 4 1. 4 0. 4 4042 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 45. 4 52. 8 57 55. 8 56. 6 3. 1 3. 4 3. 4 3. 8 3. 8 7. 9 7. 6 6. 7 6. 6 7. 6 10. 9 9. 8 8. 2 8. 9 7. 9 8. 5 7. 5 6. 9 6. 7 6. 9 6. 4 5. 4 5. 2 5. 4 4. 8 9. 1 7. 8 6. 7 6. 5 7. 1 5. 2 3. 2 3. 9 4. 2 3. 2 2. 1 1. 6 1. 3 1. 5 1. 5 1. 3 1 0. 7 0. 7 0. 7 4258 4335 4503 4383 3387 26. 5 25. 3 9. 3 9. 2 14. 1 13. 9 17. 2 16. 1 12. 6 13. 3 7. 1 8. 8 9 8. 9 2. 9 2. 7 0. 9 1. 4 0. 2 0. 4 1714 2022 Table 4. 9 Industry-wise Dividend Payout During 1990 – 2001 (in %) INDUSTRY Chemicals and Plastics Diversified Electricity Financial Services Food and Beverages Machineray Metals and Metal Product Mining Misc. Manufacturing Non-Metallic Mineral Pro Other Services Textiles Transport Equipment 1990 23. 92 25. 28 17. 98 23. 28 24. 47 23. 93 22. 84 10. 28 18. 10 19. 71 20. 01 16. 83 19. 31 1991 20. 38 20. 95 16. 21 27. 01 23. 15 20. 36 21. 47 7. 29 18. 08 17. 75 21. 15 15. 98 19. 96 1992 21. 51 22. 78 14. 15 28. 50 24. 19 22. 87 19. 86 12. 28 15. 69 16. 95 19. 25 17. 26 21. 61 1993 23. 38 25. 48 13. 37 32. 11 22. 4 23. 42 20. 65 9. 56 17. 18 16. 27 19. 84 20. 98 21. 29 1994 20. 14 22. 74 12. 48 29. 87 20. 40 23. 67 20. 92 14. 04 17. 87 14. 78 21. 15 20. 54 23. 26 1995 21. 88 23. 23 16. 98 27. 25 17. 01 22. 07 19. 76 12. 10 18. 91 14. 92 19. 60 19. 20 20. 99 1996 20. 53 21. 61 12. 70 31. 74 17. 23 20. 83 18. 82 16. 58 17. 81 13. 87 19. 34 17. 30 19. 69 1997 18. 37 23. 27 16. 32 29. 19 16. 14 19. 45 16. 78 14. 65 15. 55 13. 62 17. 43 13. 84 22. 46 1998 14. 76 19. 34 10. 42 16. 12 12. 73 16. 28 12. 56 11. 50 9. 84 10. 78 14. 00 11. 29 20. 96 1999 13. 84 17. 41 9. 35 14. 82 12. 67 15. 36 9. 37 9. 87 12. 8 9. 66 12. 27 7. 99 18. 74 2000 14. 18 17. 52 12. 68 16. 21 12. 80 15. 24 9. 16 11. 98 12. 59 8. 93 12. 85 9. 04 20. 18 2001 13. 71 13. 59 13. 08 14. 30 10. 22 15. 15 8. 74 11. 76 15. 09 11. 29 12. 54 8. 02 17. 29 Total payers have registered an increase in payout from 31. 25% in 1991 to a peak of 43. 02% in 1997 and finally paid out 37. 64% in 2001 (Figure 4. 7 and Appendix Table 4. 12). Of the payers, regular payers have consistently paid higher payout compared to that of current payers. Further, initiators have shown higher fluctuations in their payout compared to that of regular payers. In sum, average percentage PR showed a more stable pattern up to 1997 and then has shown a declining trend. Analysis of dividend payout recurrence shows that very few firms have maintained the same payout for a longer period of time. Industry-wise DPO shows a declining trend across all industries during the sample period. Of the payers, regular payers have consistently paid higher payout compared to that of current payers. Further, initiators have shown higher fluctuations in their payout compared to that of regular payers. 16 Figure 4. 7 1% Trimmed Dividend Payout % by Payer Type Current Payers Regular Payers 50 Initiators Total Payers % Payout 45 40 35 30 25 20 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Year 4. 4 Dividend Yield Average dividend yield for all companies during the period 1991 to 2001 has declined from 1. 73% in 1991 to . 55 in 1993 before finally recovering to 1. 61 in 1998 and again falling marginally to 1. 24% in 2001 (Table 4. 10 and Figure 4. 8). On the whole the dividend yield is range bound in the region of 0. 5% to 1. 73%. The reason for the fall in 1993 could be due to high increases in market capitalizations of a number of stocks in the face or irregularities in the stock market in 1992. Analysis of dividend yield by type of payer shows that initiators have always paid higher levels of dividend yield compared to that of current payers and regular payers (Figure 4. 9, and Appendix Table A4. 23). Similarly current payers have paid higher dividend yield compared to that of regular payers. Dividend yields of initiators have declined from 6% in 1991 to 1. 51% in 1993 before recovering and reaching an all time high of 10% in 1998. Compared to this current payers yielded about 5% in 1992 before falling to 1. 81 in 1993 and have subsequently recovered and reached all time high of 8. 2% in 2000. On the other hand regular payers started with a yield of close to 5% but have fallen to a low of 1. 5 in 1993 before reaching an all time high of 7. 76% in 2000. Table 4. 10 1% Upper Trimmed Dividend Yield (%)During 1991 – 2001 Year Mean Median SD Firms 1991 1. 73 . 0 2. 74 1452 1992 1. 66 . 0 2. 57 1603 1993 0. 55 . 0 0. 94 1989 1994 1. 68 . 0 3. 02 2559 1995 1. 44 . 0 2. 85 3 481 1996 1. 01 . 0 1. 88 4214 1997 1. 46 . 0 2. 99 4864 1998 1. 61 . 0 3. 80 5049 1999 1. 44 . 0 3. 86 5235 2000 1. 43 . 0 3. 96 5182 2001 1. 24 . 0 3. 15 4097 Note: Median values are considered only up to 1 decimal. However, there are non-zero values. On the whole dividend yield of aggregate payers shows a significant increase from 1991 to 2001. 17 Average dividend yield has differed from industry to industry (Table 4. 11). Diversified firms, followed by firms in electricity, food and beverages and textiles industries paid higher dividend yields in 1991 while financial services and mining firms paid the lowest. By 2001 diversified firms and electricity continue to pay higher dividend yields where firms in transport industry have improved their dividend yields by 2001. However, food and beverages and textile firms recorded lowered their dividend yield by 2001, where as firms in financial services, and mining have improved their dividend yields. Figure 4. 8 1% Upper Trimmed Dividend Yield During 1991 2001 2. 0 1. 8 1. 6 1. 4 1. 2 1. 0 0. 8 0. 6 0. 4 0. 2 0. 0 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Average (%) Year Figure 4. 9 1% Upper Trimmed Dividend Yield by Payer Type Current Payer 12 Initiator Regular Payer Total Average (%) 10 8 6 4 2 0 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Year On the whole the dividend yield is range bound during the study period. Analysis of dividend yield by type of payer shows that initiators have always paid higher levels of dividend yield compared to that of current payers and regular payers. Diversified firms and firms in the electricity industry have paid higher dividend yields during the study period. 4. 5 Summary of Analysis of Dividend Trends The number of firms paying dividend during the study period has shown an up trend till 1995 and has fallen subsequently. Average DPS on the other hand has shown a steady growth e xcept for year 2001. Average percentage PR showed a more stable pattern up to 1997 and then has shown a declining trend. Dividend yield measure is range bound. 18 Analysis also shows that only a few firms have consistently paid same levels of dividend. Analysis of dividend payout recurrence shows that very few firms have maintained the same payout for a longer period of time. Of the payers, regular payers have consistently paid higher payout as well as higher average dividend compared to that of current payers. Iinitiators have always paid higher levels of dividend yield compared to that of current payers and regular payers. Further, narrower indices appear to have higher dividends compared to that of broader indices. Industry trends indicate that firms in the electricity, mining and diversified industries have paid higher dividends where as textile companies have paid less dividends. Firms in the machinery industry which includes computer hardware and software segments have shown lower dividends. Table 4. 11 Average Dividend Yield (%) Industry-Wise During 1991 – 2001 Industry Chemicals and Plastics Diversified Electricity Financial Services Food and Beverages Machinery Metals and Metal Product Mining Misc. Manufacturing Non-Metallic Mineral Products Other Services Textiles Transport Equipment 1991 1. 79 2. 97 2. 27 0. 2 2. 18 1. 66 1. 76 0. 11 1. 41 1. 4 1. 18 2. 06 1. 53 Average 1% Upper Trimmed Dividend Yield in Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1. 92 0. 55 1. 68 1. 39 0. 99 1. 55 1. 91 1. 82 2. 49 0. 8 2. 64 1. 56 1. 3 2. 16 2. 44 2. 12 1. 31 0. 69 1. 49 1. 04 1. 14 1. 07 0. 93 0. 85 0. 9 0. 41 2. 28 1. 98 1. 45 1. 87 1. 29 1. 05 2. 06 0. 58 1. 4 0. 92 0. 7 1. 21 1. 63 1. 38 1. 55 0. 61 1. 8 1. 57 1. 07 1. 54 1. 87 1. 7 1. 81 0. 53 1. 62 1. 71 1. 15 1. 43 1. 33 1. 22 0. 05 0. 01 0. 02 0. 21 0. 52 0. 45 0. 56 1. 12 0. 98 0. 33 1. 51 1. 32 0. 89 1. 18 1. 35 1. 74 1. 55 0. 49 1. 15 1. 02 0. 86 1. 08 1. 36 1. 46 1. 37 0. 5 1. 33 1. 3 0. 81 1. 23 1. 33 0. 97 1. 8 0. 62 2. 08 1. 2 1 1. 41 1. 74 1. 48 1. 48 0. 55 1. 61 1. 36 1. 22 1. 97 2. 42 2. 24 2000 1. 66 2. 99 1. 47 1. 33 1. 12 1. 32 1. 29 0. 58 1. 34 1. 66 1. 05 1. 65 2. 76 2001 1. 35 2. 11 1. 99 1. 03 1. 06 1. 01 1. 2 0. 81 1. 29 1. 43 0. 98 1. 6 2. 04 4. 6 Changes in Tax Regime and Dividend Propensity Analysis of influence of change in tax regime on dividend propensity shows that total dividend per share has come down from an average of Rs. 0. 84 to Rs. 0. 71, where as average payout percentage has increased from 33. 33% to 51. 05% (Table 4. 12). Mimicking the trends for total firms, regular payers have registered lower DPS and higher payout percentage. As opposed to these changes over sub-periods of 3 years before and after the change in tax regime, one year changes show that DPS has more or less remained at the same level, where as payout percentage has come down from 1997 to 1999. However, paired samples t-test shows that these differences are not statistically significant, except in the case of payout percentage from 1997 to 1999 (Table 4. 13). In sum, it can be inferred from the present study that tax regime changes have not really influenced the dividend behavior of Indian corporate firms and that the tradeoff theory does not hold true in the Indian context. 9 Average Dividends Before and After the Tax Regime Change Variable Total DPS (in Total Firms Rs) Regular Payers Total DPS (in Rs. ) Immediate DPS (in Rs. ) Years Average Total Firms Payout % Average Regular Payers Payout % Immediate Payout % Years Sample After Before After Before 1999 1997 After Before After Before 1999 1997 Mean . 71 . 84 1. 55 1. 72 . 22 . 22 51. 05 33. 33 60. 53 38. 07 27. 78 35. 87 N 2597 2597 765 765 4848 4848 1217 1217 1000 1000 2987 2987 SE Correlation . 17 . 519 . 24 . 27 . 241 . 71 . 06 . 426 . 05 19. 19 . 015 1. 43 23. 35 . 008 1. 68 2. 65 . 072 2. 87 Sig. .000 . 000 . 000 . 610 . 795 . 00 Table 4. 12 Influence of Change in Tax Regime on Dividend Propensity: Paired Samples T-test Difference SE After – Before Total Firms -. 13 . 21 Total DPS Regular Payers -. 17 . 70 (in Rs. ) Immediate Years . 01 . 06 Total Firms 17. 72 19. 23 Average 22. 46 23. 39 Payout % Regular Payers Immediate Years -8. 09 3. 76 t -. 62 -. 24 . 11 . 92 . 96 -2. 15 df 2596 764 4847 1216 999 2986 Sig. .536 . 810 . 909 . 357 . 337 . 032 Table 4. 13 5. Characteristics of Dividend Payers and Non-Payers 5. 1 Profitability Payers on an average have more than twice the payoff on assets compared to that of non-payers (Table 5. 1). This finding is consistent with Fama and French (2001). Of the payers Initiators appear to have on an average higher payoff on assets compared to current payers and regular payers, though their payoffs on assets have shown considerable fluctuations. Current payers and regular payers have similar levels of payoff on assets. Of the non-payers, former payers appear to have higher payoff on assets compared to firms, which never paid dividends. Never paid in turn appears to higher payoff on assets compared to current non-payers. An analysis of EPS of payers and non-payers shows that the former have on an average higher EPS compared to the latter. The difference in magnitude is also quite substantial compared to that of payoff on assets. Of the payers, regular payers have consistently higher EPS compared to that of the other two groups of payers. EPS of current payers and initiators has shown considerable fluctuations over the sample period. Initiators have higher average EPS in the early part of 1990s and last few years of 1990s, where as in the intervening years their EPS has shown a decline. Current payers on the other hand shown an opposite trend compared to that of initiators. All the non-payer groups have shown considerable fluctuations in EPS during the sample period and on average registered a decline in EPS from 1990 to 2001. An analysis of common stock earnings to book equity 20 shows that on an average payers have dominated non-payers as the former firms registered 24% in 1991 and 15% in 2001 to 4% and –6% by the latter in the corresponding years. Of the payers, initiators have higher common stock earnings to book equity compared to that of regular payers and current payers. Regular payers and current payers have similar equity earnings to book equity. However there is a gradual decline in earnings to book equity from 1991 to 2001. Of the non-payer firms, never paid firms appear to have higher equity earnings to book equity compared to current non-payers and former payers. The difference between payers and non-payers is larger in terms of stock earnings to book equity compared to payoff on firm’s assets. These findings are consistent with Fama and French. To sum up it can be concluded that profitability has positive influence on the dividend payment of a corporate firm. Dividend payers are more profitable compared to non-payers. Further, corporate firms in general and non-dividend payers in particular have become less profitable. 5. 2 Growth or Investment Opportunities An analysis of growth of assets shows that payers on an average have higher growth compared to that of non-payers. Payers have grown at percentages of 29. 03 in 1991, 23. 69 in 2000 and 10. 82 in 2001 compared to 18. 65, 4. 12 and 1. 86 in the corresponding years for non-payers. Of the payers initiators appear to have higher growth percentage compared to that of regular payers. Initiators have grown at percentages of 29. 87 in 1991, 49. 13 in 2000 and 57. 54 in 2001 compared to 28. 2, 23. 59 and 6. 78 in the corresponding years for regular payers. Regular payers in turn appear to have higher growth compared to that of current payers. Of the non-payers, never paid have on an average lower growth in assets compared to former payers and current payers. These findings are not consistent with Fama and French where they find never paid firms to have higher growth in assets compared to that of other non-payer and payer groups. Similar trends are observed with regard to growth opportunities as measured by R&D investment to total assets. Payers appear to have higher growth opportunities compared to non-payers. Of the payers, regular payers have higher growth opportunities compared to initiators and current payers. Of the non-payers, never paid appears to have lower growth opportunities compared to current non-payers. However the percentage growth opportunities for payers as well as for non-payers are considerably low as the payers on an average have 0. 02% in 1991 and 0. 27% in 2001 compared to 0. 003% and 0. 0447% in the corresponding years for non-payers. An analysis of aggregate market value to book value of assets shows that payers and non-payers do not differ significantly. However, there are differences with in the payer and non-payer groups. For instance, initiators appear to have higher market value to book value compared to regular and current payers, where as in non-payer group, former payers appear to be dominated by both never paid and current non-payers. On the whole in the Indian context higher growth and growth opportunities have not resulted in lower dividend payments by corporate firms. This finding contradicts the findings of Fama and French, whereby they contend that growth opportunities are an important reason for reduced dividend payments by firms. . 3 Size Dividend payers appear to be much larger in size compared to that of non-payers. This observation is consistent with Fama and French (2001). Average size as measured by assets of payers averaged Rs. 104. 4 crore in 1991 and Rs. 1413. 43 in 2001 compared to that of Rs. 56. 92 and Rs. 181. 20 in the corresponding years for non-payers. 21 Of the payers, regular payers have higher assets compared to that of current payers. Current payers in turn have higher assets compared to initiators. Similarly, regular payers have grown an average asset base of Rs. 112 crore in 1991 to Rs. 711 crore in 2001 compared to Rs. 54. 71 crore and Rs. 581. 48 core for initiators and Rs. 47. 11 crore in 1992 and Rs. 654. 9 crore for current payers. Of the non-payers, former payers appear to have higher assets compared to current never paid who in turn have higher asset base compared to current non-payers. Asset base of former payers has grown from Rs. 90. 14 crore in 1991 to Rs. 239. 2 crore in 2001 while in the corresponding period never paid have grown from Rs. 51. 69 crore to Rs. 80. 57 crore. However, current non-payers have registered a decline in their asset base from Rs. 3. 5 crore to Rs. 18. 73 crore during the same period. An analysis of indebtedness of firms s hows that non-payers appear to have higher levels of long-term borrowings to assets compared to that of payers. Of the non-payers, never paid appears to have higher longterm borrowings to assets compared to former payers, who in turn appear to have higher levels compared to current non-payers. Of the payers, regular payers appear to have higher long-term borrowings to assets compared to current payers. Current payers in turn have higher levels compared to initiators. On the whole, the size of assets of firms have gone up during the period 1990 – 2001 and that increased assets seems to have been financed through long-term borrowing implying pecking order of preference for funds. Table 5. 1 Characteristics of Dividend Payers and Non-Payers Year 1991 1992 1993 Average % Payoff on Assets Current Payers 11. 20 12. 23 Initiators 9. 79 15. 15 12. 57 Regular Payers 11. 69 12. 03 12. 00 Total Payers 11. 44 12. 32 12. 07 Current Non-Payers 6. 58 5. 16 3. 69 Former Payers 10. 24 7. 41 6. 23 Never Paid 4. 44 6. 71 5. 29 Total Non-Payers 5. 49 6. 68 5. 29 Average 1% Trimmed EPS Current Payers 3. 0 4. 83 Initiators 7. 05 7. 47 5. 49 Regular Payers 14. 11 12. 79 9. 07 Total Payers 13. 20 11. 97 8. 46 Current Non-Payers -1. 61 -1. 18 -0. 49 Former Payers 0. 71 -2. 72 -3. 45 Never Paid 0. 07 1. 41 -0. 88 Total Non-Payers 0. 04 0. 49 -1. 41 Average Common Stock Earnings to Book Equity % Current Payers 21 18 Initiators 29 39 27 Regular Payers 22 20 19 Total Payers 24 24 21 Current Non-Payers -15 -7 -41 Former Payers 8 -27 58 Never Paid 14 23 47 Total Non-Payers 4 13 23 Average % Growth (Assets) Current Payers 46. 25 27. 29 Initiators 29. 87 92. 24 66. 77 Regular Payers 28. 92 62. 44 32. 20 Total Payers 29. 03 63. 66 33. 0 Current Non-Payers 16. 13 2. 34 26. 55 1994 12. 67 15. 19 12. 24 12. 58 3. 16 5. 37 4. 91 4. 79 7. 30 4. 53 9. 37 8. 67 -0. 35 -1. 64 -0. 62 -0. 81 23 32 21 24 13 72 14 21 27. 95 50. 41 36. 31 36. 17 46. 48 1995 13. 99 13. 66 12. 21 12. 56 1. 99 5. 94 5. 73 5. 41 6. 95 3. 98 8. 90 8. 15 0. 28 0. 51 0. 59 0. 54 20 26 22 23 4 -65 10 -3 1996 12. 27 11. 25 12. 02 11. 99 3. 67 9. 06 3. 89 5. 61

Intro To Exercise Science Notes

Movement of the body Adaptations to movement How has EXECS evolved? Role of Pays DE Harvard Fatigue Laboratory Krause-Weber test results Professional associations American College of Sports Medicine (CACM) Developed as a â€Å"unique blend of physical education, medicine, and physiology† Provides significant public outreach Works to shape public policy Disseminates scholarly research Broad-based coursework Anatomy and physiology Biological sciences Chemistry and biochemistry Human development and psychology Mathematics and statistics PhysicsNervous System Primary functions Control systems of the body Primary component – neuron Responds to acute challenges of the body Important consideration in: Disease conditions (e. G. Cerebral palsy) Sport performance (e. G. Controlling movement) Afferent Nerves: send signals to the brain Efferent Nerves: send signals from brain to the organ/muscle Muscular System Primary function: Provide movement Primary component Types of muscle: S keletal Cardiac Smooth – muscle fiber Hypertrophy: increase in size of muscle Atrophy: decrease in size of muscleSkeletal System Primary functions: Structural framework for the body Protects underlying organs and tissues Provides a lever system for movement Serves as a storage area for minerals Primary component – minerals and cells bone Osteoporosis is a serious disease condition: bones get brittle/weak Estonian: when bones get soft Cardiovascular System Transporting oxygen, nutrients, hormones, electrolytes, and drugs Removing waste products from the body Primary component – heart, blood vessels, and blood Urinary System Elimination of waste productsRegulation of fluid volume, electrolyte composition, and pH Primary component – kidney Hypertension can be influenced by increasing the amount of fluid removed by the kidneys Endocrine System Regulation of physiologic function and systems of the body Primary components – endocrine glands Development o f insulin resistance leads to a disease condition known as metabolic syndrome Go over the clustering of metabolic syndrome risk factors Exercise Physiology: Study of the functional and physiologic responses and adaptations that occur during and following physical activity and exercise.

Proposal for a Animation Dissertation Essays

Proposal for a Animation Dissertation Essays Proposal for a Animation Dissertation Essay Proposal for a Animation Dissertation Essay Three initial ideas for dissertation. 1. Analogue film and its imprint on the digital era. This thesis for a dissertation would have set about to analyse the relationship between analogue and digital filmmaking and the differences in these practices since the rise of the latter’s popularity and usability. The paper would have evaluated digital filmmaking practices and the new range of techniques that modern technology has brought about, giving reference to the rise of importance in editing since the development of red-one and the response to this of various filmmakers, Lars Von Trier etc. New aesthetics would have also been explored, looking at films such as Inland Empire (Lynch, 2006) and Trash Humpers (Kornine, 2009) and the ways in which contemporary films utilise imperfections of the digital medium to create new aesthetics in opposition to that of the cultured visuals of Hollywood cinematics. The essay would also have devoted a chapter to Marshall McLuhan’s theories of the postmodern effect of globalisation through the Internet and how new media has changed the face of film and the way practitioners can operate within visual culture. . Auteurism – career momentum that outlasts the diminishment of practitioner’s talents. This dissertation would have explored the effect on a director that being branded an auteur can have. The paper would have formed a discussion on how being branded an auteur early in a filmmakers career can end up inadvertently damaging their product. The dissertation would have utilised case studies on directors such as Michel Gondry, Wes Anderson and M. Night Shyamalan to form the basis for an argument on the view that the directors films are so highly praised for aspects of cinematography and narrative that, in later projects, revert to conforming to what they believe audiences expect of them and begin to display a distinct impression of ‘style over substance’. It would go on to suggest, backed up by aforementioned case studies, that directors can have the tendency to become lost within their own visuals and thematic traits and loose sight of what got them branded as n auteur in the first instance. This idea was formed through watching M. Night Shyamalan in chronological order and forming an opinion that he has utilised the ‘twist’ ending to such an extent that it no longer shocks an audience and creates the effect that garnered him so much critical acclaim after the release of The Sixth Sense (1999). Stemming from this realisation the paper would study other auteur branded director’s films and form ed an opinion on whether the tag of an auteur can damage a practitioners brand. . Hasta la vista†¦ movie – the effect of ‘geek culture’ on the modern day movie experience This paper would have studied the effect of geek culture on the modern day viewing experience when anticipating and watching an upcoming film. The paper would have drawn on statements made by Marshall McLuhan about the rise in usability of the internet and new media and how this has affected the way in which modern day audiences participate in the movie going experience. The dissertation would have utilised examples such as the modern trailer, blogs, the film website, critics reviews and events such as film and comic book conventions to introduce the thesis that curiosity and commentary on films through these mediums destroy the feeling of ambiguity experienced by cinema goers who previously could enter a film not knowing a thing about the film they were about to watch, and how this is an era that now lies well within the past. It would analyse the modern day climate in which a person can read a magazine and scour the Internet for 30 minutes and have already found out the main events, listened to the soundtrack and know every stylistic trait of a film before viewing it. The paper would have presented this view but also attempted to present an unbiased argument by stating that it is because of this ‘geek culture’ and its positive promotion on the Internet that many modern day films are produced and received so successfully. As reference for this argument a case study would be conducted into the promotion of film through viral videos, and a further case study would be conducted into the forthcoming film Tron: Legacy (2010) and how the internet may have facilitated its production. Word Count: 701 Abstract This study addresses the viability of auteurism in the contemporary moving image industries and the significance of this in relation to whether or not an animator can be considered a genuine auteur within the wider context of general artistic practice. The purpose is to provide an up to date and comprehensive, analytical framing of auteur theory and enhance the arguments laid down by critics, thinkers and theorists on both the psychoanalysis concerned with the consideration of the ‘original’ self in a postmodern society and whether the collaborative, creative nature of the animation industry lends itself to the term auteur. The dissertation will provide a social, historical and theoretical study of a number of discourses concerned with the animation industry, examining distinguishable personalities within the medium and formulating a thesis on arguments limiting auteur theory to the status of â€Å"high art† whilst questioning the genealogical construction of understanding surrounding the bourgeois construct of authorship. The paper sets about to provide an unbiased argument on the authentic nature of auteurism within contemporary perceptions of animated cinema, it attempts to present two sides to arguments that concern the author and audiences of a ‘text’ and their role within a process of cognitive perception. It will instigate discussion on aspects of auteurism by presenting case studies on Pixar and they ways in which the corporation operates in contrast to non-western animators such as Hayao Miyazaki and The Brothers Quay. The central argument is concentrated on an animator’s ability to experiment and diversify, create new perspectives on the interrelations between the highbrow and the popular, aesthetics and ideology. Word Count: 263 Methodologies Report This paper is a theoretical and historical study of the animation industry, how it has grown and blossomed from the advent of Joseph Plateau’s Phenakistoscope in 1832 and the early animated films of Reynaud And Melies in the late 1800’s, through to the modern day industry dominated by the market conditioning animation studios such a Pixar and Disney. Alongside this contextual background the relativity of auteur theory will be discussed in relation to its possible existence in a contemporary business that competes against contemporaries often seen to exist on a plane artistically above that of the mainstream animation industry. This question of authorship within the animation practice has been widely disputed and contended by a range of commentators throughout its short history and this study will serve to provide a conclusive framing of the topic. The first problem with thinking about animation and its broad stable of directors as a base for authorship can be traced back to its association with ‘high art’ and the origin of the word auteur in conjunction with media studies, Cahiers du Cinema. During the 1950’s, a period in which French film enjoyed widespread artistic acclaim, this influential film journal, written by, among others, Jean Luc Goddard, Francois Truffaut and Jacques Rivette, attempted to emphasise the role which a filmmaker assumes in the direction of their film and the significant way in which they acquired a distinguishable signature style from production to production. This became further associated with terms such as camera-stylo or metteur en scene. The Cahiers du Cinema insisted that if a director was to become recognised as displaying the traits of an auteur he must be recognised as contributing a signatory licence across a series of films, that clearly defined both aesthetic and thematic trends and offered a conclusive view of the elementary principles of an ‘art form’. Problems arose with the theories concerning auterist film practice in the late 1960’s almost a decade after the Cahiers had coined the phrase during the French renaissance. The collaborative and procedure orientated nature of making a film was called into question and â€Å"became subordinate to the critical parameters that determined film as a directors medium and as the significant voice of the film† (Wells, 2002 p. 72). Notable screenwriters such as Nicholas Kazan and Ernest Lehman have voiced their discontent with the notion of the director as the singular contributor to the stylistic and thematic contents of a film. Supporting this, since the late 60’s, few film historians have onoured the notion of a director as a singular contributing factor within a film and note other practitioners – the screenwriter, cinematographer and producer – to having mounted a substantial challenge to the directors claim to the romantic concept of the author. It is obviously true that the animation director’s influence can have a large effect upon the films artistic direction but it is interesting to consider whether or not they alone hold the pen or camera-stylo, as it were. Inevitably because of the range of opinions that exist within the subject of auteur theory especially considering the spectator and the sociological connotations that are implied by the author and audience existing alongside the text and inhabiting it (Barthes, 1982) it is hard to provide a definitive account of authorship in animation practise and the discussion of this theory remains challenging within media studies. The addition of thinking about the animation director as an auteur further complicates the debate of authorship. It can be said that in one frame of mind the animation industry perfectly echoes that of filmmaking practice in relation to production process and artistic conditioning implied through this range of processes. On the other, it further complicates the argument concerning the ability of the filmmaker to work within an arguably even larger creative environment or completely alone. It has been argued (Wells, 2002 p. 73-74) that this allows animation to be seen as one of the most auteurist of art forms and that’s its methods of production, especially when considered to be at its most collaborative, insist upon the strict intervention of a singular voice that acts as an authorial presence. Frustratingly few animation directors have been praised as auteurs within the medium, with their identities often becoming swallowed up by corporate image, in the case of animation houses such as Pixar and Disney, being debased with the appeal of consigning it simply to a petty form of narrative or, again, falling victim to the acceptance of the mutually reliant process of production. Connected to this is the concept that animation has been, and will always be, produced for a predominantly immature audience and that auteur theory cannot be applied to a film practice that concerns itself with providing articles for such a demographic. This has become a tired argument as there a huge variety of ways in which a director can be described to be an auteur. Drawing arguments from a wide variety of sources and assisted by specific case studies it is this dissertations aim to provide a vocabulary for how the animation auteur can be addressed. It is this papers intention to, utilising a variety of modes and methods, signal the opinions of scholars that have campaigned for the existence of a recognisable auteur within the media industries and then go on to transplant these theories into that of the modern day animation industry. The essay will touch on contemporary titans of the animation world such as Disney and Pixar whilst also giving special consideration for the foundations that have been laid by the historical forbearers in crafting a profitable industry in which today’s practitioners of mainstream animation operate. Alongside the mainstream, consideration will be given to the independent or ‘experimental’ animator, working outside the confines of an industry that, it has been suggested, limits they way in which a director can remain in control of the artistic and thematic outputs of their film. Special consideration will be given to the eastern European animators such as Jan Svankmajer, The Brothers Quay and Yuiry Norstein and the ways in which we can regard them as auteurs through the methods of production in which they practice their ‘art’. It will also analyse how the work of Hayao Miyazaki is differentiated from that of its western counterparts not only through its visual and thematic styles but also through the sociological boundaries in which it is released. Thought will be given to a society, and the pschoanalysis that accompanies it, in which audiences flock to the cinemas to see the newest releases from a highly recognised and respected animation house, but also, a director that is considered to be a genuine auteur and one of the artistic powerhouses of contemporary Asian cinema. Following this, my final chapter will concern itself with the major discourses in animation today. It will utilise a case study instigating investigation into the way in which the modern animation houses conduct their modes of production and whether or not this can be seen as adding to or detracting from the auteur model laid down by Cahiers du Cinema. The theoretical background for this paper will cover many areas of film history and criticism and point to key areas in which the auteur theory has come under contention, drawing on key sources it will analyse their relevance within the contemporary animation industry and provide current case studies of animation auteurs and production houses to provide a coherent context for the theories that it attains to underpin. The dissertation will cover well-known critics ranging from Cahiers du Cinema to modern day articles from film journals such as Sight Sound and The Online Animation Journal. The writings of these authors will be used to give context for some of the statements that are made concerning auteur theory and to assist in cultural references to animated movies and cinematic movements from the last 130 years. The paper will also reference the work of cultural theorists such as Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault, whose work has been invaluable in the affirmation of what constitutes a genuine author and the ways in which we can view them in a modern day society. The dissertation aims to provide a spread of criticism from a wide range of historical periods during the 20th century, and, as the essay is concerned with the shift within the understanding of an auteur and its place in the industry of today, it was considered to be important to include opinions from more than the contemporary to demonstrate the shift that has occurred in our understanding of the director as an author. Alongside a wide range of scholarly sources directly concerned with film criticism that have been implemented the essay attempts to utilise areas of psychoanalysis and cognitive deconstructions to attain some idea of how sociological boundaries have been built up concerning the idea of the individual self, especially situated within a creative industry and within the confines of a post modern society. The study borrows and reconstitutes ideas and theories from such well-known thinkers as Sigmund Freud, Jacques Derrida and Richard Harland. Although not directly connected with the world of cinema the ideas put forth by these thinkers have greatly influenced the way in which proportions of society think of the ‘unified self’ and the case for ‘original thought’. It was important to consider dialogue provided by theorists working outside of the filmic world as it has allowed the paper to gain a more conclusive view of aspects that can affect auteur theory more concerned with the workings of an audiences conscious thought, rather than that of cinematography and narrative alone. During the course of this essay the proposed theories will be analysed through a variety of method and, as mentioned, the sources come from a wide range of authors to provide many different opinions on auteur theory. These include; cultural theorists, directors, film critics and psychologists. In addition to the wide spread of authors that have been used the material has been drawn from a variety of qualitative and quantitative ources that comprise of scholarly books, newspaper articles, film journals, blogs, online critics circles, websites providing information on box office receipts, films and other visual resources. These methods have been undertaken to avoid the time consuming necessity of providing a source of self-produced data such as interviews or focus groups conducted with individual interviewees and focus groups. The data provided through this wide range of sources should compensate for a lack of self produced data and give a clear indication of the criticism and ideas that exist across a wide range of society. The main critical ideas that are analysed and enforced within this essay is an affirmative opinion that auteur theory is alive and well within the modern day film industry and that this also translates through into the contemporary animation industry. The essay sets about to deconstruct misconceptions concerning the negative reception that auteur theory receives from both cinematic and cultural theorists, and whilst the focus of the essay is very much on the promotion of the auteur director and the analysis of the cultural surroundings in which he operates the paper is careful to provide a balanced view of the topic by framing the question with both positive and negative responses. In summary, the main critical ideas to be analysed will be animation aesthetic and message as well as the existence of the auteur within the film analysing both his, or her, impact on the messages, narrative and aesthetic of the their work from film to film. It reviews the sociological structures that we are surrounded with and brought up through that allow, or disallow us, to consider the director as a true author, taking into consideration industry, modes of production, aesthetics, messages, fluency, consistency and cultural impact and finally the shift in style of animation throughout the years and how it should be considered an equally important and valuable cultural artefact as that of the live action cinema. Word Count: 1980

Inventors of the Modern Computer

Inventors of the Modern Computer In November of 1971, a company called Intel publicly introduced the worlds first single-chip microprocessor, the Intel 4004 (U.S. Patent #3,821,715), invented by Intel engineers Federico Faggin, Ted Hoff, and Stanley Mazor. After the invention of integrated circuits  revolutionized computer design, the only place to go was down in size that is. The Intel 4004 chip took the integrated circuit down one step further by placing all the parts that made a computer think (i.e. central processing unit, memory, input and output controls) on one small chip. Programming intelligence into inanimate objects had now become possible. The History of Intel In 1968, Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore were two unhappy engineers working for the Fairchild Semiconductor Company who decided to quit and create their own company at a time when many Fairchild employees were leaving to create start-ups. People like Noyce and Moore were nicknamed the Fairchildren. Robert Noyce typed himself a one-page idea of what he wanted to do with his new company, and that was enough to convince San Francisco venture capitalist Art Rock to back Noyces and Moores new venture. Rock raised $2.5 million dollars in less than 2 days. Intel Trademark The name Moore Noyce was already trademarked by a hotel chain, so the two founders decided upon the name Intel for their new company, a shortened version of Integrated Electronics. Intels first money-making product was the 3101 Schottky bipolar 64-bit static random access memory (SRAM) chip. One Chip Does the Work of Twelve In late 1969, a potential client from Japan called Busicom, asked to have twelve custom chips designed. Separate chips for keyboard scanning, display control, printer control and other functions for a Busicom-manufactured calculator. Intel did not have the manpower for the job but they did have the brainpower to come up with a solution. Intel engineer, Ted Hoff decided that Intel could build one chip to do the work of twelve. Intel and Busicom agreed and funded the new programmable, general-purpose logic chip. Federico Faggin headed the design team along with Ted Hoff and Stanley Mazor, who wrote the software for the new chip. Nine months later, a revolution was born. At 1/8th inch wide by 1/6th inch long and consisting of 2,300 MOS (metal oxide semiconductor) transistors, the baby chip had as much power as the ENIAC, which had filled 3,000 cubic feet with 18,000 vacuum tubes. Cleverly, Intel decided to buy back the design and marketing rights to the 4004 from Busicom for $60,000. The next year Busicom went bankrupt, they never produced a product using the 4004. Intel followed a clever marketing plan to encourage the development of applications for the 4004 chip, leading to its widespread use within months. The Intel 4004 Microprocessor The 4004 was the worlds first universal microprocessor. In the late 1960s, many scientists had discussed the possibility of a computer on a chip, but nearly everyone felt that integrated circuit technology was not yet ready to support such a chip. Intels Ted Hoff felt differently; he was the first person to recognize that the new silicon-gated MOS technology might make a single-chip CPU (central processing unit) possible. Hoff and the Intel team developed such an architecture with just over 2,300 transistors in an area of only 3 by 4 millimeters. With its 4-bit CPU, command register, decoder, decoding control, control monitoring of machine commands and interim register, the 4004 was one heck of a little invention. Todays 64-bit microprocessors are still based on similar designs, and the microprocessor is still the most complex mass-produced product ever with more than 5.5 million transistors performing hundreds of millions of calculations each second - numbers that are sure to be outdated fast.

Black Inventors - Patent Holders List Index R

Black Inventors - Patent Holders List Index R Black history inventors are listed alphabetically: use the A to Z index bar to navigate and select or just browse the many listings. Each listing has the name of the black inventor followed by the patent number(s) which is the unique number assigned to an invention when a patent is issued, the date the patent was issued, and a description of the invention as written by the inventor. If available, links are provided to in-depth articles, biographies, illustrations and photos on each individual inventor or patent. How to submit to the database. Victor Llewellyn Ransom #3,231,866, 1/25/1966, Traffic data processing system#3,866,185, 2/11/1975, Method and apparatus for gathering peak load traffic data Debrilla M Ratchford #4,094,391, 6/13/1978, Suitcase with wheels and transporting hook Ernest P Ray #620,078, 2/21/1899, Chair supporting device Lloyd P Ray #587,607, 8/3/1897, Dust pan Andre Reboucas NA 1895 approx Torpedo Craig C Redmond, Sr. #6,085,356, 7/11/2000, Waist Band Expander Judy W Reed #305,474, 9/23/1884, Dough kneader and roller Humphrey H Reynolds #275,271, 10/7/1890, Window ventilator for railroad cars#437,937, 4/3/1883, Safety gate for bridges Mary Jane Reynolds #1,337,667, 4/20/1920, Hoisting and loading mechanism Robert Randolph Reynolds #624,092, 5/2/1899, Nonrefillable bottle Jerome Bonaparte Rhodes #639,290, 12/19/1899 Water closet Albert C Richardson #255,022, 3/14/1882, Hame fastener#446,470, 2/17/1891, Churn#529,311, 11/13/1894, Casket-lowering device#620,362, 2/28/1899, Insect destroyer#638,811, 12/12/1899, Bottle William H Richardson #343,140, 6/18/1889, Cotton chopper#405,599, 6/18/1889, Childs carriage#405,600, 6/1/1886, Childs carriage Charles V Richey #584,650, 8/3/1897, Car coupling#587,657, 10/26/1897, Railroad switch#592,448, 12/28/1897, Railroad switch#596,427, 12/13/1898, Fire escape bracket#615,907, 6/3/1913, Combined cot, hammock, and stretcher#1,063,599, 7/7/1931, Telephone register and lock-out device#1,812,984, 2/14/1933, Lockout for outgoing calls for telephone systems#1,897,533 6/15/1897, Time control system for telephones Alvin Longo Rickman #598,816, 2/8/1898, Overshoe James Ricks #338,781, 3/30/1886, Horseshoe#626,245, 6/6/1899, Overshoe for horses Norbert Rillieux #3,237, 8/26/1843, Improvement in sugar works#4,879, 12/10/1846, Sugar processing evaporator Cecil Rivers 6,731,483, 2/14/2003, Circuit breaker with single test button mechanism Louis W Roberts #3,072,865, 1/8/1963, Gaseous discharge device#3,257,620, 6/21/1966, Device for gas amplication by stimulated emission and radiation GASAR#3,377,576, 4/9/1968, Gallium-wetted movable electrode switch Elbert R Robinson #505,370, 9/19/1893, Electric railway trolley#594,286, 11/23/1897, Casting composite or other car wheels Hassel D Robinson #D 66,703, 2/24/1925, Design for a traffic signal casing#1,580,218, 4/13/1926, Traffic signal for automobiles Ira C Robinson #3,577,514, 5/4/1971, Sustained release pharmaceutical tablets James H Robinson #621,143, 3/14/1899, Lifesaving guard for locomotives#623,929, 4/25/1899, Lifesaving guard for street cars John Robinson #356,852, 2/1/1887, Dinner pail Neal Moore Robinson #1,422,479 7/11/1922 Vehicle wheel Arnold Romain #402,035 4/23/1889 Passenger register Raymond E Rose #3,618,388 11/9/1971 Control apparatus Archia L Ross #565,301, 8/4/1896, Runner for stoops#605,343, 6/7/1898, Bag closure#638,068, 11/28/1899, Trousers support or stretcher Joseph Ross #632,539, 9/5/1899, Hay press David N Roston #556,166, 3/10/1896, Feather curler Edwin R Russell #2,855,269, 10/7/1958, The separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products#2,992,249, 7/11/1961, Ion exchange absorption process for plutonium separation#3,296,123, 1/3/1967, Removal of cesium from aqueous solution by ion exchange#3,309,323, 3/14/1967, Thorium oxide or thorium-uranium oxide with magnesium oxide Jesse Eugene Russell #5,930,247, 7/27/1999, Broadband data reception system for Worldnet access#6,044,403, 3/28/2000, Network server platform for Internet, Java server and video application server John Russell #6,968,993, 11/17/2003, Mailbox assembly Joseph L Russell #3,995,011, 11/30/1976, Preparation of tungsten hexafluoride from halogen and hydrogen fluoride Lewis A Russell #544,381, 8/13/1895, Guard attachment for beds Earl Ryder #3,129,095, 4/14/1964, High silicon cast iron